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Abstract 
Unemployment is present in many developing countries. Thus, the government of a country that suffers from chronic 
unemployment often wants to emigrate some workers to foreign countries. This paper investigates whether such a 
policy is successful for reducing domestic unemployment.
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1. Introduction 
Unemployment  is  a  significant  problem  in  many  developing  countries.  In  those 
countries, rural workers are attracted to ―the city lights,‖ and they migrate to urban areas at 
the risk of unemployment,  even though they can be fully employed in rural areas at the 
prevailing  rural  wage  rate.  Harris  and  Todaro  (1970)  formulated  this  labor  allocation 
mechanism between the rural and urban areas in developing countries. Various aspects of the 
Harris-Todaro model (HT, hereafter) have been discussed by several trade theorists, such as 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974), Corden and Findlay (1975), Khan (1980), Batra and Naqvi 
(1987), Beladi and Naqvi (1988), Hazari and Sgro (1991), Marjit and Beladi (2003), Neary 
(1991), Gupta (1993), Yabuuchi (1993), Chao and Yu (1996), Chaudhuri (2005), Marjit and 
Kar (2005), and Beladi et al. (2008) 
An extensive movement of labor continues to occur among countries: for example, 
immigration from  African countries  to  EU  countries, that from  South  Asian countries  to 
Australia,  and  so  on.  Thus,  the  governments  of  countries  that  suffer  from  chronic 
unemployment want to emigrate some of their workers to foreign countries in order to reduce 
the pressure of unemployment. Such a policy has deep historical roots: for example, the Irish 
migrated to the United States, and the Japanese migrated to Brazil in the early 20
th century.   
Two factors may influence changes in the number of migrant workers. On the one 
hand, 1) emigration tends to increase if the country of emigrant origin provides a subsidy or 
easing  quantity  control.  2)  On  the  other  hand,  some  developed  countries  restrict  foreign 
immigration for social or political considerations. If the foreign wage rate increases and/or if 
the host countries decide to accept more immigrants, then emigration from the source country 
increases. In any case, an important concern for the policy makers of the developing country 
with  a  labor  surplus  is  how  to  mitigate  the  pressure  of  unemployment.  Thus,  this  paper 
investigates whether such policies are successful for reducing domestic unemployment. 
 
2. The model and assumptions 
Let us consider a small open economy in which there are two sectors.    One sector 
produces good 1, and the other sector produces good 2. For simplicity, we label sectors 1 and 
2 as agricultural and manufacturing sectors, respectively. The production of goods 1 and 2 
requires labor and capital.   
The following symbols will be used in the formal presentation of the model. 
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j X : output of sector j (j=1,2) 
u L : unemployment 
L*: foreign migrants 
j p : price of good j (j=1,2) 
j w : wage rate in sector j (j=1,2) 
w*: foreign wage rate 
r : rate of return to capital 
L: labor endowment 
K: capital endowment. 
 
Variables  2 w , L*,  j p , w*, L, and K are fixed, while the other variables, j X ,  u L ,  1 w , and  r  
are endogenous. 
Under perfect competition, we have 
 
r a w a p K L 1 1 1 1   ,          (1) 
2 2 2 2 LK p a w a r  ,          (2) 
 
where  ij a   is the amount of the ith factor used in the jth industry to produce one unit of the 
output. We assume that all goods are tradable and, therefore, that their prices are exogenously 
given. 
    In the standard HT model, it is assumed that the wage rate in (manufacturing) sector 
2  ( 2 w )  is  set  at  a  relatively  high  level  and that  it  is  rigid  due  to  some  political  and/or 
institutional considerations, whereas the wage rate in (agricultural) sector 1 ( 1 w ) is flexible. 
In addition, there is a possibility of emigrating abroad. We assume that emigration is possible 
only from the urban area because of institutional or geographical restrictions. It is assumed 
that the foreign wage rate (w*) is fixed because the country is assumed to be small. Thus, a 
fixed  number  of  workers,  chosen  randomly  from  the  urban  labor  force,  are  allocated  to 
migrating temporarily and earning wage w* with certainty. Hence, the labor movement is 
temporary migration under a work permit scheme, rather than permanent migration.  It is 
natural to assume that the foreign wage rate (w*) is higher than the urban wage rate ( 2 w ) of 
the developing country. In this situation, the rural workers have two alternatives: staying in 
rural areas in order to obtain a secure job at a low wage rate, or migrating to urban areas or 
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foreign countries in order to seek a high wage income at the risk of unemployment.    Thus, 
the labor allocation mechanism between the sectors is shown as follows: 
 
    1 2 2 2 2 /( *) * */( *) uu w w L L L L w L L L L       ,    (3) 
 
where  2 2 2 () L L a X  ,  u L   and L* are the employed, the unemployed labor in the urban area, 
and the foreign migrants, respectively. In the labor market equilibrium, therefore, the wage 
rate in sector 1 ( 1 w ) equals the expected wage income in the urban area, which equals the 
manufacturing  wage  rate  ( 2 w ),  times  the  probability  of  finding  a  job  in  the  urban 
manufacturing sector, plus the foreign wage rate (w*), times the probability of obtaining a job 
in  the  foreign  country.  According  to  the  standard  HT  labor  allocation  mechanism,  it  is 
implicitly assumed that unemployed labor is supported by employed labor, such as other 
members of the family, or that a job is allocated daily (or monthly and so on) to all applicants 
by lottery. Otherwise, unemployed labor cannot survive since an unemployment allowance is 
not considered in the standard HT model.     
  Exogenously given endowments impose the following resource constraints: 
 
  1 1 2 2 * L L u a X a X L L L     ,              (4) 
  1 1 2 2 KK a X a X K  .  (5) 
 
This completes the specification of our model with the fixed endowment of factors and the 
internationally  determined  prices.    We  have  five  unknown  variables  1 w ,  r,  2 1,X X ,  and 
u L , which are solved by equations (1)–(5) for given parameters,  2 w , w*,  2 1, p p ,L, K, and 
L*.   
  In the following discussion, the factor intensities between factors play an important 
role. Thus, we make the following assumption:     
 
Assumption 1:    Sector 2 is capital-intensive relative to labor compared to sector 1 in the 
value sense, i.e., 
 
    2 2 2 1 1 1 // rK w L rK wL  1 1 2 2 2 1 0 L K L K ww         , 
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where  j j j L K k /  ,  (j  =  1,2),  and  ij  is  the  allocative  share  of  the  ith  factor  in  the  jth 
industry (e.g., K X aK K / 2 2 2   ).   
 
This assumption is the Khan-Neary stability condition, which is well known in the literature.   
 
3. Emigration and unemployment 
  Now let us examine the effect of promoting emigration on urban unemployment. 
Migrant workers increase either because of a subsidy from the home country or from an 
exogenous  increase  in  the  foreign  wage  rate.  Immigrants  will  also  increase  if  foreign 
governments relax immigration regulations or if the home country imposes migration limits. 
These situations can be captured by an increase in the foreign wage rate (w*) or an increase 
in the number of migrants (L*). 
  It can be seen that the model is decomposable between price side and quantity side. 
Thus, the price variables, 1 w   and r are fixed from (1) and (2) under the constants 2 w ,  1, p  
and  2 p . This implies that all input coefficients,  ij a , are also constant in our model. 
  Totally differentiating (3) – (5), we obtain 
     
1 12
1 2 2
1 1 2 2
ˆ *0
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 0 * 0 *










                                      
,    (6) 
where  ˆ / A dA A    for  any  variable  A,  / uu l L L    and  * */ l L L  .  It  is  assumed  that  the 
foreign wage rate (w*) is higher than the urban wage rate ( 2 w ). Thus, it can be expressed as 
 
      21 (1 ) * w aw w     ,    01   . 
 
  By solving (6) with respect to L*, we obtain 
 
      1 1 2 2 1 ˆ ˆ / * *( *)( )/ u L K L K L L l w w        ,       (7) 
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      1 2 2 1 ˆ ˆ / * * *( )/ u L K L K L w w l       ,        (8) 
 
where  1 1 2 2 2 1 ( ) 0 u L K L K u l w w l          ,expressing the value of the determinant of the 
coefficient matrix of (6). 
  It can be shown that   
 
     
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
1 1 2 2 1 2 1
{ (1 ) *}
( ) (1 ) * 0
L K L K L K L K
L K L K L K
w w w w w
ww
         
      
      
    
. 
 
Then, it holds that  1 1 2 2 1 2 1 ( ) (1 ) * 0 L K L K L K ww            . Also, we have   
 
      1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 ( ) ( ) 0 L K L K L K L K ww             , 
 
since  12 ww  . Thus, it can be shown that  ˆ ˆ / * 0 u LL    and  ˆ / * 0 u Lw  . Thus, the results are 
summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition  1.  In  an  economy  with  urban  unemployment,  emigration-promotion  policy 
increases unemployment. 
 
  At  first  sight,  the  increase  in  foreign  emigration  (L*)  may  be  considered  to  be 
beneficial  to  the  economy  as  an  effective  policy  to  reduce  unemployment.  However,  it 
induces a large amount of domestic migration from rural to urban areas, which exceeds the 
increase in both urban employment and foreign migration, resulting in an increase in urban 
unemployment. An increase in the foreign wage rate (w*) also has a similar effect on the 
labor movement. Thus, a policy aimed at promoting migration and/or exogenous changes in 
favor of emigration cannot solve the problem of unemployment. Though the result is very 
pessimistic, our result shows the possibility of an unexpected outcome by focusing on the 
indirect effect through the domestic labor movement from rural to urban areas. Contrary to 
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expectation, one implication of these results is that restriction on temporary migration will 
reduce unemployment. Furthermore, our results depend crucially on the assumption that in 
order  to  migrate,  a  worker  has  to  be  a  part  of  the  urban  labor  force.  This  suggests  the 
importance of examining the issue under the assumption that migrants are taken from the 
agricultural labor force. In addition, policy makers need to consider some other policies—for 
example, wage and production subsidies, and capital inflow from abroad. Our model provides 
a  useful  framework  for  examining  the  effectiveness  of  these  alternative  policies  in  an 
economy with unemployment and foreign migration. 
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